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An Agent-Based Computational Approach to  
“The Adam Smith Problem” 
Michael Gavin ∗ 
Abstract: »Das Adam Smith Problem. Ein agentenbasierter Integrations-
vorschlag«. This paper uses agent-based modeling to investigate the philosophy 
of Adam Smith. During his lifetime, Smith published two books. In An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), he argued that 
market behavior was dictated primarily by self-interest. However, his earlier 
book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), placed sympathy and benevo-
lence at the center of human social psychology. Reconciling these apparently 
contradictory views is known as the Adam Smith Problem. This study uses an 
agent-based model to combine Smith’s theories, exploring how social norms 
affect economic behavior, and vice versa. Although they share many basic as-
sumptions, Smith’s works leave important questions unanswered: Theory of 
Moral Sentiments offers a strong model of how social norms consolidate but 
lacks a coherent explanation for how norms change over time, and, on the oth-
er side, Wealth of Nations does not account for the influence of social norms 
on commercial transactions nor for the durability of seemingly irrational norms 
in a context of market competition. Considering both theories together in a 
single model sheds light on their underlying tensions and exposes instabilities 
that Smith did not anticipate. 
Keywords: Adam Smith, agent-based simulation, agent-based computational 
economics, social norms, digital humanities, intellectual history, Theory of Mor-
al Sentiments, Wealth of Nations. 
1.  Introduction  
Scholars of eighteenth-century philosophy are likely, at one point or another, to 
bump up against the “Adam Smith Problem.” The contours of this problem are 
familiar but worth reviewing. During his lifetime, Adam Smith published two 
books: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). In Wealth of Nations he argued 
that market behavior was dictated primarily by self-interest. Smith writes,  
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It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address our-
selves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities but of their advantages (I.2.2.). 
However, Smith’s other major work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), 
begins by offering a fundamentally different view of human motivation:  
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles 
in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their hap-
piness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure 
of seeing it (I.i.1.).  
By sympathetically identifying with others, Smith argues, people develop an 
internal sense of justice, propriety, and benevolence that informs all their ac-
tions. While in Wealth of Nations Smith makes little mention of sympathy, in 
Theory of Moral Sentiments he places sympathy at the center of human social 
psychology. Moral behavior and market behavior are presented as separate 
phenomena. Smith makes little effort in either book to reconcile their apparent 
contradictions, nor does he ever explicitly justify his decision to treat his topics 
separately. 
How do Smith’s moral sentiments emerge into collective norms, and how do 
those norms affect commercial behavior? Defenders of Smith have argued that 
his theories share a common abstract premise: both take the individual person – 
the feeling, desiring, and choosing agent – as their basic unit, and both are 
concerned primarily with how interactions among agents cause larger social 
patterns. However, whereas other scholars are content to acquit (or accuse) 
Smith based on the fundamental compatibility (or incompatibility) between his 
assumptions, this essay tackles the much trickier problem of evaluating wheth-
er those behavioral assumptions entail compatible social consequences. I use an 
agent-based model for this purpose. My argument proceeds with a brief discus-
sion of agent-based modeling as a technique for intellectual history. I next 
review scholarship on Smith’s philosophy. I then turn to the model itself, com-
paring its algorithms to Smith’s theories and describing ways in which its re-
sults support or undermine various interpretations that Smith scholars have put 
forward. I will argue that, although they share many basic assumptions, Smith’s 
works leave important questions unanswered: that Theory of Moral Sentiments 
offers a strong model of how social norms consolidate but lacks a coherent 
explanation for how norms change over time, and, on the other side, that 
Wealth of Nations does not account for the influence of social norms on com-
mercial transactions nor for the durability of seemingly irrational norms in a 
context of market competition. Considering both theories together in a single 
model sheds light on their underlying tensions and exposes instabilities that 
Smith did not anticipate. 
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2.  Agent-Based Computation and the Study of Social 
Norms 
“Moral Markets” was designed and written in NetLogo (version 5.0.5).1 Like 
similar toolkits, NetLogo allows researchers to simulate social and biological 
systems as fields of interacting entities (agents) whose simple individual behav-
iors collectively generate larger emergent patterns.2 Joshua Epstein, a leading 
advocate and practitioner of agent-based modeling, refers to the technique as 
“generative social science.”3 Whereas traditional empirical research tests theo-
ries by comparing their predicted outcomes to real-world experiments or 
events, agent-based simulations test theories by using them as design principles 
for computer programs, then executing those programs and evaluating the 
results. If the effects we observe really do depend on the causes we posit, we 
ought to be able to replicate them in silico. This theory of explanation has been 
summed up by Fred Dretske in the motto, “If you can’t make one, you don’t 
know how it works” (Dretske 1994, 468).4 
Applications of agent-based modeling to intellectual history remain rare, but 
a computer model of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is not without prece-
dent. The computational modeling of norms is fairly well-established in the 
social sciences, where Robert Axelrod has been a pioneering figure. His essay, 
“An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” uses game theory to model acts of 
moral defiance and punishment in an abstract, simulated community (Axelrod 
1997). Following Axelrod, Epstein has designed a number of agent-based 
simulations to study norms: his models have outlined norms’ relation to class 
distinctions, demonstrated how “cooperative persistence” might diffuse over 
space and time, and identified an inverse relationship between mental delibera-
tion and conformity (Epstein 2006, 218). More recently, the 2014 collection of 
essays, Minding Norms, uses an agent-oriented approach to explore the psy-
chology of conformity to show how “emergent” patterns of norm-formation 
correlate to “immergent” effects on individuals, who internalize moral beliefs 
through social interaction (Conte, Andrighetto and Campennì 2014, 9). In fact, 
                                                             
1  For an overview of NetLogo and its use as a tool for scientific inquiry, see Railsback and 
Grimm (2012) and Gilbert (2008). 
2  A general overview of the theory and practice of agent-based modeling and its application 
in the social sciences can be found in Miller and Page (2007). 
3  Most pertinently, see Epstein (2006). This collection of essays builds on Epstein’s earlier 
work, described in Epstein and Axtell (1996). 
4  Epstein carries this line of argument even further, suggesting that how-to-build-it 
knowledge is sufficient – not just necessary – for how-it-works knowledge. In Growing Arti-
ficial Societies, Epstein, with Axtell, asks, “What constitutes an explanation of an observed 
social phenomenon? Perhaps one day people will interpret the question, ‘Can you explain 
it?’ as asking ‘Can you grow it?’” (20). 
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part of the Minding Norms project involved the creation of HUME1.0, an 
agent-based simulation premised loosely on the moral philosophy of Smith’s 
predecessor, David Hume (Will and Hegselsmann 2014). 
Modeling social norms doesn’t involve empirical inquiry in the colloquial 
sense, in part because sociological data about moral beliefs is notoriously hard 
to collect, but more fundamentally because simulation always remains at an 
ontological arm’s-length from reality.5 What happens in a simulation never 
happens outside the simulation. For scientists, this gap can be very troubling, 
and much polemical effort has been invested in critiquing and defending the 
use of models and simulations. (The science of climate change, for example, 
depends crucially on simulation.) Agent-based models of social systems have, 
thankfully, avoided being caught up in these controversies, and so its theorists 
are more free to acknowledge ABMs function as a “theory building” or heuris-
tic tool. Rather than represent complex systems mimetically, agent-based simu-
lations always point centripetally to the ideas at their core.6 Models are espe-
cially useful when scholars have identified some simple process and hope to 
tease out its more complex secondary and tertiary consequences. For this rea-
son, although the output of simulations involves statistical analysis, charts, 
graphs, and the other trappings of inductive reasoning, in fact models of this 
kind operate more like thought experiments extended through computation. 
They typically function deductively or abductively, and their purpose is to test 
the internal consistency of causal explanations (Bonnet 2007; Dixon 2012). 
I began by creating a simulation of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
then I combined that model with an already existing (indeed, famous and oft-
studied) model in the field of agent-based computational economics. Based on 
my reading of the primary and secondary literature, to which I will turn in a 
moment, my guiding assumption was that Smith’s philosophy is neither inher-
ently flawed nor contradictory, but that the connection between his works is 
underdetermined. Therefore, the model was designed to exhibit behaviors at 
both the micro and macro levels that correspond analogically to Smith’s ideas 
while “generating further, more specific, ‘middle range’ theories” about how 
his individual- and community-level generalizations correlate (Gilbert 2008, 
                                                             
5  For a discussion of the ontology and epistemology of simulation in relation to the practice 
of history, see Gavin (2014). For a general account of simulation as a tool of explanation in 
the sciences, see Winsberg (2010). 
6  Jim Doran and Nigel Gilbert (1994) write, “There are different reasons for modelling. The 
aim may merely be to construct a model that is valid at least to some degree – that is, 
whose behaviour does match that of the target in at least some significant respects. By con-
structing such a model, we may hope to gain insights into the target itself. Such modelling 
is exploratory in nature, often involves theory building, and is the type of modelling mainly 
at issue in this book.” Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments tends to operate at a very 
abstract level, and so an agent-based simulation that uses Smith’s theories as design princi-
ples must be similarly abstract. 
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41). That is to say, I hope to make better and more detailed inferences about 
how Smith’s ethics inform his economics, and vice versa. The model is not 
meant to be validated against any dataset; instead its success depends on this 
heuristic result. 
3.  The Adam Smith Problem 
3.1  Competing Interpretations of Smith’s Work 
Scholarship on the Adam Smith Problem can be divided into two camps. Com-
patibilist arguments identify common ground across the two works, while 
incompatibilist arguments look for points where the works would benefit from 
more explicit differentiation. Scholars tend to emphasize one view over the 
other, but most adopt a mix of compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. As 
originally formulated in the nineteenth-century, the Adam Smith Problem was 
understood straightforwardly as a contradiction between sympathetic altruism 
and market-based egoism.7 As we shall see, this apparent contradiction largely 
disappears upon closer inspection, but tensions between Smith’s works remain 
a topic of debate. According to Jack Russell Weinstein,  
In the last decades, […] [scholars] have replaced the original formulation with 
a host of other Adam Smith Problems, a diverse list of supposed incompatibil-
ities between TMS and WN that call the unity of Smith’s work into question 
(2013, 50).  
(In what follows, my conclusions will add to this list.) 
The strongest arguments for Smith’s unity draw out the implicit conceptual 
similarities between his works.8 Contra incompatibilist claims that altruism and 
egoism are opposites, Smith advanced an individual-based model of sympathy 
and moral development. The “sympathy” that individuals feel drives their 
socialization: by witnessing how other people handle joys and pains, we con-
stantly evaluate them, and in doing so we internalize a sense of how others will 
judge us. Smith personifies this internalized socialization as an “impartial spec-
tator”: 
Whatever judgment we can form concerning [our own sentiments and mo-
tives], accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to what are, 
or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought 
                                                             
7  For an overview of the history of the Adam Smith Problem, see Otteson (2002).  
8  Another important compatibilist argument is biographical. Although they were first pub-
lished almost twenty years apart (leading some scholars to believe that Smith had simply 
changed his mind), Smith revised and republished Theory of Moral Sentiments throughout 
the rest of his life and, as A. L. Macfie notes, “there is no hint that Smith himself thought 
there was any conflict of doctrine between the two books” (1967, 76). 
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to be the judgment of others. We endeavour to examine our own conduct as 
we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon 
placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and 
motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approba-
tion of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disappro-
bation, and condemn it. (III.i.2) 
Thus, what folk psychology might call a person’s “conscience” becomes, for 
Smith, an internally projected personification of social norms.9 By imagining 
ourselves under “the judgment of others” we learn to regulate our conduct and, 
Smith believes, develop a sense of common morality:  
Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that 
thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not 
only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural and 
proper object of hatred. (III.i.8)  
Because people naturally seek to avoid admonishment – not only from other 
people but from their internally held ideas about what other people might say – 
they are guided by external and internal stimuli to obey “natural” virtues like 
justice, prudence, charity, and magnanimity. 
3.2  Smith’s View of Norms as Emergent Phenomena  
Working out from these psychological assumptions, Smith argues that moral 
standards develop much like commercial markets. Widely shared social norms 
represent collective patterns that emerge through countless personal encoun-
ters, as people trade judgments about proper and improper behavior. James 
Otteson places this market analogy at the center of his claim that Smith’s theo-
ry describes a world “in which free exchanges among participating people give 
rise, over time, to an unintended system of order” (2002, 101).10 Genevieve 
Lloyd describes the impartial spectator’s emergent properties in similar terms: 
“out of those shifting and turbulent – intense yet fragile – interconnections 
between selves, there can emerge a stable, objective moral consciousness” 
(2013, 92).11 Across the two books, then, it’s possible to trace Smith’s persis-
                                                             
9  Knud Haakonssen describes the process this way: “The internal spectator has the force to 
prompt such adjustment of behavior as would otherwise be demanded by external specta-
tors in order to satisfy the inclination to or the need for agreement or conformity. In other 
words, one only learns to see oneself as a person and as a member of a moral universe of 
agents through sympathy with others’ view of one’s identity and situation in the world. So-
ciety is, as Smith says, the mirror in which one catches sight of oneself, morally speaking” 
(2002, xv).  
10  Weinstein disagrees with Otteson’s “market metaphor.” Weinstein points out that “Smith’s 
moral theory does not involve exchange” (Adam Smith’s Pluralism, 66, original emphasis). 
11  For Lloyd, the central puzzle of Smith’s ethics is the question of how such a system can give 
rise to a shared sense of moral standards without collapsing into moral relativism. Amartya 
Sen (2009, 403-6) distinguishes between two kinds of impartiality: “closed impartiality,” 
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tent concern with patterns of self-organization. Both Wealth of Nations and 
Theory of Moral Sentiments are important founding documents in the study of 
complex social systems, and they share a common underlying thesis that indi-
viduals and societies are mutually constitutive. 
Much like markets reach equilibrium, morals reach consensus, although this 
consensus is neither perfectly stable nor absolute. Jerry Evensky explains, “In 
Smith’s analysis, every society is a unique social construction with its own 
established norms that are peculiar to its time, place, and circumstance” (2005, 
49). Smith does not endorse moral relativism, but his theory is acutely aware of 
cultural difference. In a chapter “Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion on 
Moral Sentiments,” Smith writes: 
Every age and country look upon that degree of each quality, which is com-
monly to be met with in those who are esteemed among themselves, as the 
golden mean of that particular talent or virtue. And as this varies, according as 
their different circumstances render different qualities more or less habitual to 
them, their sentiments concerning the exact propriety of character and behav-
iour vary accordingly. (V.I.17) 
Like the “invisible hand” that guides an economy’s production and circulation 
of goods, the “golden mean” of moral propriety is subject to continual flux 
while, as Smith makes clear elsewhere, tending always toward a common good. 
The same spirit that motivates Smith’s optimistic liberalism in Wealth of Na-
tions leads him in Theory of Moral Sentiments to a bottom-up system of ethics 
that remains open and pluralistic while affirming “natural” virtues that trans-
cend cultural boundaries. 
For scholars who read Theory of Moral Sentiments closely, the Adam Smith 
Problem can seem to melt away. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie called it a 
“pseudo-problem based on ignorance and misunderstanding” (Smith 1759 
[1982], 20). More recently, important books by Amartya Sen, Charles Gris-
wold, James Otteson, Jerry Evensky, Stephen McKenna, and Jack Russell 
Weinstein have emphasized strong continuities across Smith’s corpus, even if 
they sometimes disagree whether to call the “tensions” and “inconsistencies” 
that remain a “problem.”12 Griswold (1999) finds a conflict between Smith’s 
                                                                                                                                
which evaluates questions of justice according to local, parochial social norms, and “open 
impartiality,” which self-consciously adopts a more cosmopolitan outlook. Sen argues that 
Smith advocates open, cosmopolitan impartiality. 
12  The word “problem” in the phrase “Adam Smith Problem” perturbs some Smith scholars. 
Although he disputes the phrase “Adam Smith Problem,” Macfie acknowledges “considera-
ble inconsistencies” between the two books (1967, 81). Similarly, Weinstein (2013) dismisses 
the notion of a “Problem” with bravado, saying that its resolution is “shockingly straight-
forward.” Yet, he too acknowledges “there are tensions, sure.” It’s rarely clear what’s at stake 
in the debate over the phrase. Over the past thirty years, the dispute seems to hinge on 
whether Smith’s works share a fundamental unity, despite many differences, or whether 
Smith’s works have many differences, despite sharing a fundamental unity. 
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“historicism” and his “Platonic commitments” to moral truths. Göçmen argues 
that Smith’s works expose a fundamental flaw in the logic of capitalism, and 
that Theory of Moral Sentiments offers an “immanent critique” of commercial 
society (2007, 157).13 Most pertinently, Otteson (2002) points out that Smith 
fails, at a very basic level, to explain “the matter of how morality mixes with 
markets.” “If the Smith of TMS is right,” Otteson says, “one does not – or 
should not – check one’s morality at the marketplace door.” 
In the Moral Markets model I follow Otteson’s call to account for the way 
“morality mixes with markets” in Smith’s philosophy. If the compatibilist view 
of Smith’s work is correct, Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations 
share a common model of human behavior. In which case, it should be possible 
to formalize Smith’s moral and economic behavioral theories in a way that 
demonstrates their fundamental compatibility while leaving open the question 
of whether he was right about their emergent social properties. My goal is to 
paraphrase Smith’s views into machine-readable algorithms that test how mor-
alizing behaviors influence market behaviors in silico. If Smith’s models of 
human behavior share many similarities, will they behave well together in 
simulation? 
3.3 Smith’s Idea of ‘Natural Prices’ Compromised by Moral 
Judgments  
Before turning to the model, however, a few more words about the Adam 
Smith Problem. Otteson’s answer to the question of how morality mixes with 
markets rests on what he calls “the familiarity principle.” Because Smith’s 
benevolence is generally confined to persons within an individual’s circle of 
family and friends, and because commercial transactions happen largely among 
strangers, Otteson believes that self-interest, rather than sympathy, can account 
for economic transactions. Macfie and Raphael (1982) and Weinstein (2013) 
make similar arguments. However, for Smith, moral sentiments are infused in 
all social interactions. The impartial spectator is deeply embedded in the 
Smithian psyche, and he provides no hint that it’s ever possible to set one’s 
socialization aside.  
Consider, for example, Smith’s brief discussion in Wealth of Nations of 
wage and profit differentials in eighteenth-century Britain. In a chapter titled 
“Of Wages and Profit in the Different Employments of Labour and Stock,” he 
                                                             
13  Göçmen explains, “My main claim is that there is only one concept of human nature in 
Smith’s work, but that it consists of two complementary elements. The first is a general 
normative view of human nature. The second and more specific is an account of the human 
situation in commercial society. There is indeed a contradiction between these two aspects 
of Smith's anthropological view. Unlike many scholars, however, I suggest that this contra-
diction should not be ascribed conceptually to Smith. Rather, it is a real problem arising 
from social relations in commercial society” (2007, 2). 
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includes a section that explains “Inequalities arising from the Nature of the 
Employments themselves.” His thoughts lead him to contrast “honourable 
professions” from trades that involve cutting meat: 
Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions. In 
point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally under-
recompensed, as I shall endeavour to show by and by. Disgrace has the contra-
ry effect. The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business; but it is in 
most places more profitable than the greater part of common trades. The most 
detestable of all employments, that of public executioner, is, in proportion to 
the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade whatever. 
(I.10.5) 
Self-interest guides this economic account, but that self-interest involves a 
complicated amalgam of motives: Smith counts “honour” and “disgrace” in the 
wages of labor. These concepts are moral sentiments, and their circulation has a 
lot to do with how labor and goods are priced in a commercial society. When 
Smith says that public executioners earn higher wages “in proportion to the 
quantity of work done” because their work is “detestable,” he endorses an 
economic model that factors emotions and morals into the components of 
price.14 
For now I just want to highlight one point: scholars puzzling over the Adam 
Smith Problem tend to focus exclusively on the narrow issue of “benevolence,” 
and in doing so they radically underestimate the applicability of Smith’s ethics 
to his economics. We may not be able to rely solely on the benevolence of our 
butcher for our dinner, but he’ll feel every moment the sting of our disdain, and 
his work is priced accordingly. The executioner demands a special price for 
human heads. Smith provides other examples. Innkeepers make a higher rate of 
profit because they endure the rude behavior of guests. Clergymen make less 
because they enjoy the dignity of their office. Opera singers and actresses earn 
exorbitant wages because they must overcome the embarrassment of public 
performance, which the accomplished ladies of Smith’s eighteenth-century 
Britain would sooner forgo. These examples are not exhaustive but are meant 
to demonstrate Smith’s general point: all wages and profits are naturally deter-
mined at least in part by the moral sentiments that attend their employment of 
labor and stock. 
                                                             
14  The account Smith offers here shares much in common with “rational-choice theory,” which 
was first popularized by economist Gary Becker in The Economics of Discrimination (1957). 
Trying to account for the way that bigotry depresses wages for black workers, Becker fac-
tored in a “taste for discrimination” that racist whites sometimes hold, and he developed a 
model to describe how such “disgrace” (to return to Smith’s phrase) is factored into the cost 
of labor. The core idea of rational-choice theory is that putatively non-rational, emotional, 
or cultural considerations can be usefully reduced to factors in a straightforward decision-
making process about cost and benefit, or risk and reward. 
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However, such remarks appear only briefly in Wealth of Nations, and Smith 
never really explains how he believes moral ideas affect commercial exchange. 
Indeed, his definition of the “natural price” of goods largely sets the matter 
aside: 
When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is suffi-
cient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the 
stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according to 
their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natu-
ral price. (I.7.4) 
Price covers all the major costs: rent of the land, wages of labor, and the profits 
of stock. The natural price of any commodity is achieved when its market ap-
proaches equilibrium according to their natural rates. At first glance, this defi-
nition looks like a simple tautology. Smith makes no mention here of the “natu-
ral inequalities” of wages and profit that attend different employments, but 
neither does he explicitly exclude them, so it could be that they are implicitly 
included in the phrase “according to their natural rates.” If so, the moral senti-
ments that accompany labor and profit would somehow be embedded in the 
prices of commodities and therefore of all goods and services, meaning that 
any commodity’s “natural price” is set ultimately by the “natural virtues” de-
scribed in Theory of Moral Sentiments. But this presents a difficult problem. 
On the one hand, Smith suggests that exchange value is highly dependent on 
moral value. On the other hand, he provides no mechanism for identifying 
either the degree of dependence or the micro-level process. How are prices 
affected? How do people make choices? The dots are tantalizingly close to-
gether, but Smith never connects them. One way to understand the Adam Smith 
Problem is to see it as the scholarly project of connecting these dots. 
Because Smith left so many of the connections between his works implied, 
readers interested in those connections are forced to make inferences on 
Smith’s behalf. The question shifts from “What did Smith argue?” to “What do 
Smith’s ideas imply?” Generative modeling is particularly well-suited to con-
tribute to this line of inquiry, because it was specifically designed to facilitate 
this kind of inference. 
4. Formalizing Smith’s Ethics  
4.1  Review of Smith’s ‘Impartial Spectator’ Model 
According to Smith’s Theory, every person is pulled simultaneously by three 
distinct moral forces. First, they have internally felt pleasures and pains that 
motivate them to act on passions, some of which are “selfish” and some “so-
ciable.” Second, they have the examples and admonishments of their immedi-
ate interlocutors, which together amount to locally determined norms of behav-
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ior. Lastly, every person carries within their minds an impartial spectator who 
speaks on behalf of their more durably experienced moral beliefs: the impartial 
spectator is the “golden mean,” or average of averages, of every local norm that 
people encounter over the courses of their lives. 
Figure 1: The Impartial Spectator Procedure 
 
The impartial spectator procedure is described in Figure 1. It is triggered when-
ever individuals encounter one another. Because all social encounters are occa-
sions of moral surveillance, people feel pressure to exert magnanimity (or 
“self-command”) at every moment. These pressures may involve significant 
ethical dilemmas, such as deciding whether to cheat a customer, but they might 
just as well involve simpler acts of self-control, like suppressing immoderate 
laughter or using a handkerchief, rather than a petticoat, to wipe your nose. The 
pressure to conform will prove more or less powerful depending on the extent 
to which a person’s desires deviate from social demands. For most people most 
of the time, Smith suggests, conformity isn’t particularly difficult (and may 
even escape notice). The gap between one’s desires and one’s context usually 
is not too severe, and so people behave most of the time according to the dic-
tates of their impartial spectators without paying it much heed. Further, because 
people exist together in a common social space – because they share a common 
“age and nation”– their impartial spectators tend toward a common mean and 
emerge as natural standards of behavior that are reinforced synchronically, by 
cross-cultural comparison, and diachronically, through education. However, 
neither the standards nor their enforcements are absolute, so individuals with 
unusual desires or poor self-command will always pop up here and there, and 
they may at times even disrupt the entire system, which is subject to an unspec-
ified process of change over time. 
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4.2  Parameters of the Moral Markets Model 
The above summary of Smith’s theory is neither original nor, I hope, contro-
versial. However, my next claim pushes against the general drift of recent 
scholarship on Smith’s philosophy.15 The ethical subject described in Theory of 
Moral Sentiments is mathematical and procedural at its base, and therefore it 
translates easily into algorithmic expression. The impartial spectator procedure 
describes the interaction of four closely related, commensurable variables: 
- Agents’ desires (D), assigned randomly to signify the agent’s desired be-
haviors at any given moment; 
- Agents’ self-control (M, for “magnanimity”), a randomly assigned value 
meant to signify that agent’s ability to conform in any given situation; 
- Agents’ behavior (B), their actual behavior at any given moment; 
- Agents’ moral belief (S, for “spectator”), their ideas about how agents 
ought to behave in general. 
In Smith’s theory, people are always comparing themselves to those around 
them. At any given moment, they experience a local norm that prevails among 
their neighbors, represented in the model as the average behavior of people 
within a visible area (Na). The impartial spectator for each person is the “golden 
mean” of the local norms they individually experience over time. 
Once these variables are in place, they can form the core of a simple algo-
rithm that models behavior. At every time step, the model updates its key vari-
ables. The agents move randomly (Smith offers no theory of space or move-
ment, so that’s left completely abstract). Every area will host a new norm (Na) 
based on the average behavior of agents within a visible radius  
Na = mean(Ba) 
Every agent updates its moral belief by incorporating the local norm (Nl) into a 
rolling average of its personal experience, such that  
Si = mean(Nai) 
After these values are determined, agents respond to their surroundings by 
adjusting their outward behavior to conform (or not) with agents around them. 
People sometimes find it difficult to conform to their internally held sense of 
propriety; this difficulty can be expressed as the absolute difference between 
the demands of local propriety and their internally felt desire (| N - D |). If the 
gap between social expectations and internal passions is less than or equal to 
their magnanimity (M), they will behave according to their impartial spectators; 
otherwise they will follow their socially unacceptable desires. Expressed algo-
rithmically: 
   
                                                             
15  In addition to Weinstein, see Evensky (2005, 247): “Smith sees humankind as a uniquely 
complex realm of nature that does not lend itself to such reductionism.” 
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For every person p at time t in area a, 
   if | N - D | <= M 
        then B = S 
   otherwise B = D 
Formalizing the impartial spectator procedure in this way allows for a number 
of computationally verifiable inferences. Because the outcome of each person’s 
decision about how to behave, B, contributes to the social norms, N, that locally 
prevail, this algorithm operates recursively (“poietically,” in Charles Gris-
wold’s phrase) to generate its own conditions.16 
4.3  The Impartial Spectator in Action: Testing the Model 
In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith does not speculate about precise socio-
logical facts. It’s never clear what percentage of the population (a phrase 
anachronistically applied to Smith’s thinking) he believes conforms to natural 
virtues. However, the general mechanism is clearly stated: moral sentiments 
emerge through their expression and regress toward a mean as they are various-
ly internalized and assented to. All else being equal for a set of randomly inter-
acting agents, this algorithm should tend inexorably toward values of B, N, and 
S with standard deviations (σB, σN, and σS) that correlate directly with the 
average values of M and a. Restated in common prose, this means that if people 
in a community have greater self-control and less privacy, their communities 
will have a more uniform moral composition. If individuals prefer not to con-
form or cluster into small subgroups, their communities will display a greater 
diversity of behavior and moral beliefs.17 If we accept the above summary of 
                                                             
16  Griswold (1999, 146) writes, “From Smith’s spectating standpoint in the philosophical critic’s 
balcony of the theatrum mundi, the (so to speak) non-natural nature of moral standards is 
inseparable from the fact that all of morality, and indeed all of the human ‘world,’ is a com-
plex whole that we communally impose on ourselves. Yet Smith also holds that this ‘poietic’ 
character of the ‘world’ is not generally visible either to actors or spectators. As a result, 
morals are ordinarily thought to possess a reality and authority that is external to us.” The 
recursive element of norm formation and internalization is also central to the agent-based 
computational model described in Conte, Andrighetto, and Campennì (2014, 8-9): “While 
moving around in the social space, meeting with one another, [agents] act as intelligent 
norm-seekers, or norm-detectives: they apply some of their cognitive capacities to finding 
out norms. Once external signals have been turned into mental representations of a norma-
tive kind, agents may decide whether to behave in accordance with norms, or with what 
they believe to be such, or not. By doing so, they provide new inputs to other agents, who 
will possibly convert them to the corresponding behaviors, and so on and so forth, in a re-
cursive way.” 
17  The contrast between cosmopolitan and parochial patterns of norm emergence, implied in 
Smith’s theory, is noted in Sen (2009). Göçmen (2007, 134) finds similar implications: “A 
harmonious and open society without fragmentation can form our emotional and intellec-
tual dispositions in a different way from a closed one. Under the conditions of an open and 
harmonious society, for example, the general intellectual and bodily capacities of man can 
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Smith’s views, and if the consequences that logically seem to follow from that 
summary bear out in silico, we have good reason to believe that Smith’s ideas 
imply similar consequences. 
Moral Markets began as a simple model of Smith’s ethics, based on the im-
partial spectator rule described above. To ease visualization, I indexed the 
agents’ variables (B, D, and S) to a scale of 0 to 140, which happens to match 
NetLogo’s color scheme. Thus, as agents change their moral self-presentation 
(B), they change color. The patches represent local norms (N) and they change 
color to match the colors of agents in their area, so the shifting normative 
standards can be visualized as changing colors in a field. When the model runs, 
its colors ebb and flow like weather-map clouds looping over a blank landscape 
or like the bubbling oils of a lava lamp. Through the graphical interface, users 
can test how the system responds to changes in agents’ parameters (see Figure 
2.) When agents are initialized with high levels of magnanimity, they tend to 
conform to each other’s expectations, and the view takes on a fairly even color 
with only slight variations. When agents feel free to follow their own passions, 
the system erupts into particolored clusters. 
Figure 2: Moral Markets 
 
Moral markets (2014 NetLogo Community Model), exported Views after 300 Ticks Left: Self-
command (M) and visibility (a) set to 100 and 8. With high visibility and high self-control, 
agents tend to conform. Right: Self-command (M) and visibility (a) set to 30 and 2. At lower 
levels of visibility and control, behavior is more diverse. 
                                                                                                                                
be formed in a way such that the agent can act spontaneously, i.e. without any long and deep 
considerations, on the basis of the principle of impartiality, spontaneously taking both gen-
eral and particular interests into account. In a fragmented and, therefore, closed society in 
which the agent is embedded, his durable intellectual and emotional dispositions will be 
formed partially, so that the agent can act only from a partial point of view, being unable 
to take into account the general point of view.” 
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Smith never speculates about how powerful the impartial spectator generally is, 
suggesting only that it varies from person to person. For this reason, in Moral 
Markets, each agent carries a different value of M, but those values are distrib-
uted along a normal curve that the researcher controls. It’s possible to set the 
average M anywhere from 0 (meaning very few agents would ever conform to 
their moral beliefs) to 140 (resulting in total conformity). Testing the perfor-
mance of a model across a spectrum like this is called “sensitivity analysis.” 
Researchers test agent-based models by running them with different settings to 
see how sensitive their performance is to changing parameters. Sensitivity 
analysis allows researchers to identify points where models “break” (that is, 
where outcomes are completely unrealistic), as well as tipping points where 
“phase changes” in plausible emergent patterns occur.18 
Visualizations like Figure 2 are helpful for getting an initial sense of how a 
system operates, and they’re indispensable during the process of building a 
model because of how quickly they expose semantic errors in the code. How-
ever, they’re of limited interpretive value if you want to make detailed compar-
isons across multiple runs. For that, it’s better to sift through the data generated 
by the simulation. In this model, differences in how norms circulate correspond 
to differences in several key statistics (see Table 1). Color variations like those 
visualized in Figure 2 can be measured simply as standard deviations: How 
much variance is there in the agents’ colors (their individual behaviors, B), in 
the colors of the patches (the local norm, or the average behavior in any given 
locale, N), and in each agent’s invisible moral beliefs (the average of all norms 
experienced by agent, their “impartial spectator,” S)? When the average self-
control, or “magnanimity” is set to 100 (out of 140 total possible), most agents 
will conform to the dictates of their conscience in all but the most extreme 
scenarios. Indeed, whether visibility was high or low, conformity was at or near 
100%. When their self-control was set only to 30, on the other hand, agents 
were much less likely to conform, and the behaviors they displayed were sub-
ject to much higher variation. By contrast, their moral beliefs (the “impartial 
spectator”) varied by the agents’ visibility. When the visible area is set only to 
two patches, rather than eight, agents measure their behavior against much 
smaller subsets of agents. Smaller groups allow for more variation, both in 
local norms and moral beliefs. 
One striking fact about agent and patch behavior in “Moral Markets” is the 
persistent gap between levels of variation in behaviors (σB), local norms (σN), 
and sentiments (σS). This dynamic can be seen more clearly in Figure 3, which 
performs a more complex sensitivity analysis. Table 1 displayed the results of 
4,000 runs of the model, 1,000 each at four different settings. Figure 3 shows 
                                                             
18  According to Gilbert (2008, 45), sensitivity analysis is “aimed at understanding the condi-
tions under which the model yields the expected results.” 
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results of a 10,000 runs. Values of M were tested at every integer from 1 to 
100, and, at each step, the model was run with values of a set from 1 to 10, in 
increments of 0.1. In the heat maps, M is distributed along the x-axis and a 
reaches up the y-axis. Dark colors on the maps show high levels of variance, 
and light colors represent low variance. 
Figure 3: Self-Command and Visibility 
 
Sensitivity analysis testing relation between self-command (M, x-axis) and visibility (a, y-axis). 
3.1 shows that variation in behavior B is related almost entirely to self-command, and 3.2 
show that variation in internal beliefs of the spectator (S) depend mostly on the visibility of 
agents to each other. The locally prevailing social norms (N) are sensitive to both variables. 
 
As you can see in Figure 3.1, the left side of the map is entirely red [/dark]. At 
low levels of magnanimity, agents will display a wide range of behavior: few 
people bother to follow their own rules. At higher levels of magnanimity, they 
display low variation. This pattern holds over the entire vertical axis. In Figure 
3.2 we see the opposite pattern. Variations in moral beliefs are fairly consistent 
horizontally but differ based on the value of a. Moral sentiments consolidate 
independently of actual behavior, but they display more or less variation de-
pending on how visible agents are to each other. When visibility is set to low 
levels, agents learn parochially, comparing themselves only to other agents 
within a small radius. When visibility is set higher, agents develop in a more 
cosmopolitan way, taking large surveys of their peers at every step. How agents 
behave is highly dependent on their self-control, but what they believe isn’t. 
Social norms, however, are responsive to both variables. In Figure 3.3, only the 
lower left corner displays a high level of variation. The areas on the upper left 
and lower right, which are darker for the values B and S, here appear light, 
suggesting conditions under which collective behaviors might consolidate into 
norms, even in the absence of widespread conformity, or even in a context of 
moral disagreement. 
moral belief (spectator)
self-command self-command self-command 
vi
sib
ili
ty
 
(n
or
m
 ra
di
us
) 
local norms moral belief ( pec ator)behaviour 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  324 
4.4 Initial Results: Using the Model to Reconsider Smith’s Idea of 
‘Natural’ Virtues  
Still setting aside the incorporation of market behavior, to which I’ll turn in the 
next section, these results point to a much-discussed interpretive difficulty in 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. This difficulty involves the relationship 
between morals and norms: To what extent does Smith’s theory of “natural” 
virtues correspond to a theory of moral absolutes, and to what extent does his 
cultural pluralism lend support to “moral relativism”? Related to this is a sepa-
rate but equally pressing question: Does Smith offer a merely descriptive ac-
count of how moral sentiments consolidate into social norms, or does he pro-
vide a trustworthy prescriptive ethics to evaluate moral dilemmas? An agent-
based model can’t answer these questions, but it can shed a different light on 
their central ambiguity, and it might suggest why Smith is so difficult to pin 
down.  
In a loosely conforming society, this model suggests, social norms exhibit 
greater variety than morals. In a highly conforming society, less. In either case, 
individually held beliefs tend to have greater stability and exhibit less volatility 
over time. If we can imagine what the agents might say were they sentient, it’s 
easy to imagine them reporting that morals are more stable, more true, than 
social norms – indeed, that morals transcend mere norms, which either vary 
from one context to the next or, at another extreme, artificially constrain every-
body. Under Smith’s theory, this suggests, people can believe the truth of mor-
al sentiments and reach a widely shared consensus about them, even if few 
people actually abide by them. This analysis doesn’t suggest that justice, be-
nevolence, magnanimity, and prudence are “natural” virtues, but it does sug-
gest why a practical thinker like Smith would be comfortable with the ambigui-
ty involved in calling them so. 
Some scholars have questioned whether Smith’s theory of the impartial 
spectator is sufficient to account for the consolidation of a shared normative 
consensus.19 To the extent that this agent-based simulation accurately executes 
Smith’s assumptions, it supports his theory. Not only is the impartial spectator 
sufficient to generate, in silico, a widely stable normative field, the simulation 
also paints a very interesting picture about how those norms relate to the beliefs 
                                                             
19  Though James Otteson, for example, takes it to be paradigmatic that norms emerge via the 
“impartial spectator procedure,” Weinstein’s critique of Otteson’s “market metaphor” specif-
ically focuses on this as a key point, “The rules of morality are anything but spontaneous; 
they are progressive. Certainly, they are discovered and assented to by different individuals 
and communities at different times, but this is the product of long-standing inquiry, ration-
al discourse, and the consequences of trial and error. This exploration is dependent on the 
nature of arts and literature, education and socialization, and a complex account of ration-
ality and historical progress that is far more sophisticated than any economic account of 
competition of preferences” (2013, 66). 
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people hold. The model suggests why individuals might experience a discon-
nect between their social contexts and their moral beliefs, as well as why they 
might infer from this disconnect that their moral beliefs are transcendently true 
and therefore not at all dependent on the social conditioning that, in fact, creat-
ed them. We might say that Smith is ambiguous on the topic of moral absolutes 
because he never teases these issues out, perhaps in part because, for Smith, 
these questions were so tied up with religion and natural theology.20 Less charita-
bly, we might say that he simply fell prey to the very illusion his model predicts. 
4.5  Smith’s Failure to Account for Change over Time  
This computational model strongly confirms the ability of Smith’s model to 
reach moral equilibrium. So strongly, in fact, that it actually raises the opposite 
problem: after equilibrium is reached, it’s not clear how norms ever can 
change. The sensitivity analyses performed above show how the system will 
operate differently when variables are initialized at different levels, but in none 
of the runs does the model exhibit large spontaneous shifts. Given the stability 
of moral consensus under this model, how are large-scale changes even possi-
ble? Otteson has pointed out that “Smith does not consider in any systematic 
fashion the phenomenon of moral deviancy” (2002, 306). Without a robustly 
articulated theory of why people might choose alternate norms to adhere to, it 
is difficult to explain how changes would emerge from the bottom up. Smith 
has strangely little to say about how norms evolve – strangely, because his 
underlying theory seems to sketch out principles that should facilitate change, 
but nothing in Theory of Moral Sentiments describes a mechanism that actually 
brings it about. Axelrod has argued that a “good theory of norms […] should 
explain three things: how norms arise, how norms are maintained, and how one 
norm displaces another” (1997, 46). By this rubric, Smith’s theory meets the 
first two requirements but fails the third. This failure is reflected both in the 
secondary literature and in the performance of the model in simulation. How-
ever, Smith is acutely aware of cultural difference, both across geography and 
across history, and Theory of Moral Sentiments seems to be motivated in large 
                                                             
20  Smith scholars are divided on the extent to which Smith’s theory of natural virtues implies a 
theory of moral absolutes. Macfie (1967, 73) argues that “Smith, like Hume, had no philo-
sophical belief in absolutes, only a 'cool' hope in very gradual, if stumbling improvement.” 
Evensky (2005, 57), however, has argued that, although moral absolutes are not manifest as 
uniform social norms, they nonetheless subtend social moral jockeying: “Smith's approach 
to ethics can be understood as moral relativism and invisible absolutes.” For Haakonssen 
(2002, viii), Smith’s apparent interest in moral universalism was only “about which features 
appeared to be universal to humanities and which ones appeared more or less historically 
variable.” Haakonssen continues, “The universality in question was entirely a matter of ob-
servable generality […] Smith was, in other words, not interested in any metaphysics of 
morals” (ibid.). 
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part by his desire to understand why norms differ across place and time. The 
problem is that he leaves the mechanism of differentiation almost completely 
implied. 
He did leave behind a few tempting clues. In a brief discussion of commer-
cial norms Smith argues that the division of labor results in a division of moral 
sentiments: 
The objects with which men in the different professions and states of life are 
conversant, being very different, and habituating them to very different pas-
sions, naturally form in them very different characters and manners. We ex-
pect in each rank and profession, a degree of those manners, which, experi-
ence has taught us, belong to it. (V.ii.3) 
Across societies as wholes,  
the style of manners which takes place in any nation, may commonly upon the 
whole be said to be that which is most suitable to its situation. Hardiness is the 
character most suitable to the circumstances of a savage; sensibility to those of 
one who lives in a very civilized society. (V.ii.13) 
In this section, Smith seems to veer toward something like cultural relativism. 
His chapter on custom concludes with a discussion of infanticide, a practice 
common in ancient Greece, even, to Smith’s dismay, “among the polite and 
civilized Athenians” (V.ii.15). However, such “barbarity” must necessarily be 
confined to a single practice and can’t be representative of the culture as a 
whole, because, “No society could subsist a moment, in which the usual strain 
of men’s conduct and behaviour was of a piece with the horrible practice” 
(V.2.16). Taken together, these comments suggest that norms cluster around 
particular kinds of labor. Professions and nations vary according to the kinds of 
work expected of them, which sometimes might be the mere effect of chance 
but other times are driven by the underlying conditions of the labor itself. In 
any case, norms develop against certain limits that occur naturally: societies 
might subsist for centuries while countenancing infanticide, but a general per-
missiveness toward murder would guarantee its immediate demise. 
In short, Smith seems to suggest that norms evolve through some process 
akin to natural selection: norms that are conducive to a community’s well-
being are more likely to gain assent. If that’s true, and if communities change 
over time as their “circumstances” change, then the evolution of morals should 
be closely tied to a nation’s economic activity. Different circumstances might 
reward different norms, and the same process that leads the invisible hand to 
distribute goods and services might also distribute moral sentiments. This pos-
sibility brings our attention back to the Adam Smith Problem. Understanding 
how economic activities affect the development of social norms turns out to be 
a necessary step to complete Smith’s ethics. 
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5.  Modeling the Adam Smith Problem 
5.1  Incorporating Economic Behavior in the Model 
Moral Markets combines an original approximation of Smith’s Theory of Mor-
al Sentiments with the trading function of “Sugarscape,” the now-canonical 
virtual economy described in Joshua Epstein’s and Robert Axtell’s Growing 
Artificial Societies (1996) and adapted to NetLogo by Iain Weaver in 2009.21 
Sugarscape is one of the most studied and re-purposed simulations in the field 
of agent-based modeling. Its most successful application was in the “Artificial 
Anasazi” project, which simulated population shifts that occurred among the 
prehistoric Anasazi Indians in the American Southwest (Dean et al. 2000). 
Commercial activity in the Sugarscape model involves a simple bartering sys-
tem. Some agents produce “sugar” and others produce “spice,” but all agents 
need a steady supply of both, and so they must trade to survive. As the supply 
of either commodity rises and falls, so too its relative price rises and falls. 
(There is no money in the system, so “price” is the quantity of sugar an agent is 
willing to trade for a unit of spice, and vice versa.) Describing the model, Ep-
stein and Axtell (1996, 11) specifically invoke Adam Smith’s economic theory: 
“this completely decentralized, distributed achievement of economic equilibri-
um […] harks back to Adam Smith and the classical economists.” 
To test how Smith’s economic “invisible hand” might affect his moral 
“golden mean,” I borrowed the farming and trading functions of Sugarscape 
and incorporated them into the Moral Markets model.22 The functions are large-
ly unchanged; however, I added two key procedures that connect agents’ moral 
and commercial activities. First, I made it possible for agents to specialize by 
making color a multiplier for production. Spice growers will reap more spice 
when their outward behavior (B) approaches the value of 140, the purple and 
pink sections of NetLogo’s color scheme. Sugar growers, on the other hand, 
reap more sugar when their outward behavior approaches 0, where the colors 
are red and gray. This rule creates an economic incentive toward specialization 
and, all else equal, implies that agents will tend to deviate morally based on 
profession. Second, I added a moral component to Sugarscape’s trading func-
                                                             
21  Iain Weaver, The Sugarscape (2009 NetLogo community model). Weaver’s adaptation was 
itself based on an earlier version by Owen Densmore in 2003. For a detailed description of 
this adaptation of “Sugarscape,” see <http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/interdisciplinary 
-science/research/the-sugarscape>, (Accessed January 30, 2018). 
22 The complete Sugarscape model includes many procedures that I did not borrow. For exam-
ple, Sugarscape simulates a more complex agrarian geography that distributes commodities 
unequally, while Moral Markets does not. Epstein’s model also simulates disruptive forces 
like epidemics that Moral Markets sets aside in order to focus on questions most directly 
applicable to the Adam Smith Problem. 
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tion. Whereas in the original, agents trade on a simply rational calculation of 
material welfare, in Moral Markets agents are unwilling to do business with a 
agent whose color differs too greatly from their own. Each agent is assigned a 
value for their “tolerance,” a variable that functions much like “magnanimity.” 
When deciding whether or not to engage in a transaction, each agent calculates 
the absolute value of the difference between its color and the color of its poten-
tial partner. If that difference is greater than their tolerance for difference, they 
do not perform the transaction. 
These two principles, specialization and discrimination, are meant to corre-
spond analogically to Smith’s theory of “natural inequalities” in the profits of 
labor and stock, whereby economic specialization provokes moral demands 
that many people are unwilling to make. Just as Adam Smith’s modest ladies 
refuse to debase themselves by singing in public, so too agents refuse to do 
business when their sensibilities are too greatly offended. 
5.2  Moral Markets: A Baseline Scenario 
To understand how the model works, it helps to see how agent behavior chang-
es over time and how it varies when economic and moralizing functions are 
combined. When trading functions are disabled, agent behavior varies accord-
ing to visibility, tolerance, and self-command, but that variation quickly con-
solidates around a stable mean. Average wealth and population are, of course, 
perfectly stable. On the other hand, when trading functions are activated but 
moralizing functions are disabled, the model achieves a very different kind of 
stability. Sugar and spice growers quickly specialize: each has an economic 
incentive to adopt the outward behavior that enjoys the greatest premium on 
their productivity. As a consequence, the society divides into two species of 
agents. Because of randomization built into the agents’ movements, the relative 
population and wealth of each type fluctuates, but once they have sorted into 
behavioral types, such fluctuation occurs around consistently stable averages. 
When only moral procedures are active, the agents achieve stable norms. When 
only trading procedures are active, the agents achieve a stable, maximally 
productive economy. 
Taken individually, Smith’s moral and economic theories imply societies 
that tend toward equilibria, but, when his theories are combined, neither equi-
librium proves sustainable. Figure 4 illustrates one iteration of the model’s 
performance when both sets of procedures operate in tandem.23 In this run, 
agents evaluate each other’s colors and adjust their impartial spectators accord-
                                                             
23  In this run, the settings were as follows: initial self-command = 80, initial tolerance = 10, 
vision = 5, and specialization = 10. During the research process, the model was run using 
many different settings to see how the agents behave under a variety of conditions. Adjust-
ing the parameters can generate many different shapes of distortion. 
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ingly. However, at the same time, they also gather resources and look for trad-
ing partners while refusing to trade with agents whose colors are too different 
from their own.  
Figure 4: Wealth per Capita and Behavior by Profession 
 
Agent behavior by profession over 5,000 steps, showing the relationship between wealth and 
outward behavior. Between timestamps 2,000 and 3,000, the spice growers benefited from a 
moral environment that increased their productivity (average behavior > 70). This situation 
flipped from timestamp 3,000 forward. 
 
sugar 
spice 
sugar (B) 
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The bottom half of Figure 4 shows the average color, or outward behavior, 
exhibited by sugar and spice growers over time. At initialization, when agents’ 
colors are uniformly distributed between 0 and 140, too many are outside the 
bounds of their neighbors’ tolerance. Sugar and spice growers briefly special-
ize, but because those new-born specialists are unable to find trading partners, 
many die. Those that survive quickly conform to a common community stand-
ard – the “golden mean” of moral sentiments. (This is typical behavior in the 
model for the first hundred steps, as the initially randomized agents first begin 
trading.) For the next 2,000 time-steps, the system reaches near-total moral 
conformity. Not only is the mean color at the spectrum’s midpoint, the standard 
deviation around that midpoint collapses to zero for long stretches of time with 
only a few initial blips. Agents reproduce on average every fifty ticks, so 2,000 
time-steps represents a period of about forty generations. Analogized to human 
life-spans, this is roughly the duration of the Dark Ages. Somewhere around 
time 2,000, this conformity is shattered. The agents’ mean color shifts upward 
to near 80, where it rests for a while before being pulled down dramatically in 
the steps leading up to time 4,000, then finally settling around 60. This graph 
illustrates sporadic disunity, as the population shifts wildly from periods of 
total conformity to bursts of moral diversity. 
To understand why these patterns emerged in the agents’ moral behavior, it 
is necessary to see the corresponding changes that occurred in their economic 
activity. The top graph of Figure 4 shows the comparative wealth agents held 
over time. For the first 2,000 time-steps, they enjoyed relatively equal prosperi-
ty, much like the equality experienced when the economic functions are run in 
isolation. However, just before time 2,000, the spice growers experienced a 
brief spike of wealth superiority, freeing them to test behaviors (B) above the 
mean of 70 that had prevailed to that point. Agents began to conform to this 
new norm, and spice growers enjoyed a 1,000-tick economic advantage. With 
communal norms closer to their specialization, the spice growers could be more 
productive, enjoying greater wealth and enforcing a normative mean closer to 
their ideal. However, the concentration of wealth among spice growers meant 
that they were able to support a comparatively larger population of sugar grow-
ers, each of whom had an economic incentive to pull the collective moral 
standards back to their advantage. As the population’s wealth and norms re-
approached its traditional mean, the whole system radically tipped. A small 
number of sugar growers were able to capture an enormous quantity of wealth, 
freeing them to shift in their moral self-display and allowing them to be even 
more productive as they pulled the entire population in their direction. By time 
4,000, the sugar growers’ moral and commercial hegemony was secured, and a 
very small number of agents effectively dominated the entire system. If the 
model had been allowed to continue, the spice growers might have staged and 
won another counter-revolution, or the entire population might have died out 
(as often happens). In any case, this model tells a fable of normative and com-
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mercial jostling, resulting in long periods of conformity punctuated by mo-
ments of economic and moral upheaval. 
5.3  Sensitivity Analysis over Key Variables 
When a sensitivity analysis is performed across multiple settings these results 
bear out dramatically. Economic production is closely correlated to the moral-
izing behaviors of the agents – see Figure 5. The best performing economies 
are those that are able to support the largest populations. Higher levels of eco-
nomic productivity are correlated to greater variation in behavior, whether that 
variation is calculated as a deviation from the mean or as the difference be-
tween sugar growers and spice growers. In tolerant societies, producers feel 
free to pursue their independent, specialized labor. The division of labor in-
creases the total production of the society as a whole, but only when agents are 
willing to accept variation in normative display. When they are prone to moral 
jostling, as in the individual run narrated above, economic production is de-
pressed. 
Similarly, inequality correlates negatively to prosperity. In this model, 
healthy societies tend to distribute their resources more equally. Figure 6 dis-
plays the most unequal societies. Runs that demonstrate the most extreme 
wealth differences between sugar and spice growers tend to appear in the low-
er-left corner, where agents are willing neither to conform to each other nor to 
tolerate the differences they encounter. Highly unequal societies tend to exhibit 
much higher levels of moral conflict, often fluctuating wildly between periods 
of conformity and periods of fragmentation. 
Figure 5: Effects of Tolerance and Self-Command on Agent Performance 
 
Sensitivity testing the correlations between self-command (M, x-axis) and tolerance, showing 
their combined effect on behavioral specialization (left), behavioral variance (middle), and 
average population (right). At low levels of self-command and high levels of tolerance, agents 
are more prosperous (they can support a larger population) while displaying greater variation 
overall and greater difference between sugar and spice growers. 
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Figure 6: Tolerance and Self-Command of the Lowest-Performing Economies 
 
Correlation between tolerance and self-command in the 100 runs that displayed the highest 
level of wealth inequality between spice and sugar growers. Inequality is strongly correlated 
with a combination of lower self-control and lower tolerance, which tend to depress total 
economic activity and concentrate wealth among fewer agents. 
6.   Discussion and Conclusion 
The above narration may seem far removed from a close reading of Smith’s 
texts, but it suggests a number of important implications about the Adam Smith 
Problem.24 As I see them, these implications can be stated as four general prop-
ositions about the ways that “morality mixes with markets,” to return to James 
Otteson’s phrase. As interpretations of Smith’s philosophy, the first two propo-
sitions should not be controversial. The second two might be. 
                                                             
24  These results were anticipated in outline by Macfie (1967, 111-2) as a likely scenario: “For 
by their very anonymity, free markets, open to equals, supply the conditions in which the 
‘exact’ rules of justice can operate. History has shown this has considerable truth. Freedom 
however allows wealth to breed, and this re-establishes inequality and privilege throughout 
societies. There is then bound to be constant ‘justling.’ It is inherent in human nature that 
the struggle for power (his ‘place’), is continuous and radical.” 
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6.1  Moral Agreement Is Necessary for Doing Business 
This agreement can come about either through general conformity to prevailing 
social norms or through a general tolerance for behavioral diversity. Under 
conditions where discrimination is common, market competition operates as a 
powerful force driving conformity. The internalization of social norms via the 
“impartial spectator” means that moral beliefs, once firmly entrenched, are 
likely to persist for long periods of time, even if they reduce overall productivi-
ty. However, when moral beliefs are persistently at odds with economic incen-
tives, those beliefs – and, thus, economic activity – are prone to explosive 
fluctuation.  
6.2 How Moral Sentiments Are Structured Affects How Business Is 
Conducted 
In a community where labor is divided, a tolerance for moral specialization will 
enhance that community’s overall production.25 This is seen in the model when 
higher levels of economic activity are associated with higher tolerance for 
moral difference and wider variation in behavior. Smith glimpses this idea in 
his famous discussion of England’s corn laws, where he highlights the econom-
ic benefits of morally repugnant actions (in this case, exporting corn for profit 
while local consumers risk starvation). The converse is also true: general con-
formity to moral beliefs that don’t enhance productivity will tend to depress 
economic behavior. This should come as no surprise, even though Smith never 
states it explicitly. Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1714) famously 
argued that moral scruples are bad for business. Smith knew Mandeville’s work 
well, and the model diagnoses a similar dynamic precisely. Smith’s economic 
system depends on a willingness to accept the social and moral fragmentation 
associated with the division of labor; however, the impartial spectator is always 
pushing with unspecified intensity against such specialization, distorting be-
haviors and prices. 
6.3  Moral Discrimination Causes Inequality 
Insofar as members of a community generally conform to social norms that 
incentivize certain kinds of work and not others, those norms encourage and 
enforce inequality. This result is seen in the model when agents willingly sacri-
fice productivity to conform to the norms of their more prosperous customers. 
Smith seems to recognize this point in his discussion of the “natural inequali-
                                                             
25  This view, or something close to it, has been advocated recently by McCloskey (2010), who 
argues that an eighteenth-century transformation in moral values – placing greater dignity 
in the merchant class and common trades – was the primary factor driving Britain’s eco-
nomic success. 
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ties” that attend the “Wages and Profit in the Different Employments of Labour 
and Stock.” He compares butchers to other common trades and inn keepers to 
farmers, concluding that morally repugnant uses of one’s time and one’s capital 
will tend to earn a premium on one’s compensation: if the work is “odious,” the 
workers will tend to earn more. Bucking moral consensus to pursue profit does 
provide individuals with market advantage, the model confirms. However, if 
those individuals are successful, not just compared to their immediate competi-
tors but compared to the community as a whole, the model predicts they will 
pull moral consensus in their own direction. They will then earn extra compen-
sation at least in part because of moral beliefs that are widely assented to even 
though many people who work to support them are excluded from their bene-
fits. These inequalities are not the result of the ebb and flow of supply and 
demand, at least not in the conventional sense. Long-term structural inequali-
ties are enforced socially and internalized psychologically, and so they can 
remain rigidly in place over many lifetimes, despite other economic incentives 
that might push against them. When considered separately, nothing in Wealth 
of Nations or Theory of Moral Sentiments predicts a caste system. Considered 
together, I believe they do. 
6.4 Because They Are Spontaneous but Persistent, Moral 
Sentiments and the Inequalities They Engender Seem Natural, 
but Are Not 
I have already argued that Smith’s faith in natural virtues reflects a kind of 
false consciousness. Because moral beliefs exhibit a stability that individuals’ 
behavior and social norms do not, it is easy to see why Smith was comfortable 
in taking them to be “natural.” So too, inequality. On the one hand, this last 
proposition veers closely toward a traditional Marxist critique of morality as 
“ideology.” I do mean to endorse such a critique, but I also mean something 
more narrow and precise. Smith’s belief in a “natural price” for commodities 
and labor is compromised by the artificiality of the norms that structure the 
rates of supply and demand. If there is no such thing as a natural virtue, there 
can be no such thing as a natural price, because the price of any good or service 
is inevitably bound up in the moral jockeying of competing embarrassments. 
The notion that any good or service has a natural price to which it will tend in 
the absence of distortion rings false, because there is no theoretically possible 
absence of distortion. A “natural” price is a price distorted by norms we assent 
to. Only when they are distorted by norms with which we disagree (nepotism, 
insider trading, racial discrimination, etc.) do prices seem unnatural. At bottom, 
price is a function of shame. 
In the above discussion, I’ve hoped to demonstrate that easy-to-overlook de-
tails from Smith’s philosophy entail significant consequences that Smith him-
self did not foresee. I have marshaled two distinct kinds of evidence to support 
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this claim: my reading of Smith’s works and a simulation meant to correspond 
to that reading. Both are liable to objection. Better models of Smith’s theory 
might be developed, and certainly the model could be developed in greater 
detail. In Moral Markets, homogeneous agents trade opinions about only one 
“moral sentiment,” whereas in Smith’s Theory people differentiate among each 
other and among virtues. For example, it would be interesting to see how intro-
ducing gender and sexuality might distort the agents’ behaviors and beliefs. On 
the economic side, three notable absences include money, geography, and 
policy. As written, the model has no function for money, so wealth accumula-
tion is limited and agents can never enter into employment relations. The simu-
lation’s treatment of space is similarly abstract. The placement of farms, towns, 
and trade routes might very well affect the circulation of norms, as well as 
goods, in measurable and replicable ways. Lastly, the model might include 
functions that formalize long-dominant norms into laws, allowing to test the 
relative effects of norms and policies. However, my sense is that any of these 
improvements would only further strengthen the core argument of this paper: 
Adam Smith was wrong to treat his subjects separately, and we ought not to 
persist in his error. 
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